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Abstract
Existing literature argues that taking a holistic
approach to disaster management is important for
organizations in achieving resilience. However,
theoretical underpinnings are lacking to achieve a
holistic understanding. This paper applies the notion of
an ecosystem as a holistic lens to understand complex
disaster management.
We report two case studies from Japan and Nepal
to illustrate how an ecosystem works during a disaster.
The Japan case is a government initiative, whereas the
Nepal case is a non-governmental initiative. The
theoretical framework of information ecology is used
in analyzing the cases.
Based on the findings, we formulate three
propositions that show important elements of
ecosystems to approach resilience. The study suggests
that coevolution is a key to respond to constantly
changing situations during a disaster. To accomplish
ecosystem coevolution, creating a collaboration system
with governments and local communities and
embedding local knowledge into the system are
essential. Furthermore, digital tools can play a critical
role in the coevolution process.

1. An ecosystem as a means to achieve
resilience
In a crisis situation, international and national
organizations and individuals from local communities
play an important role in providing response and
recovery. When we consider effective disaster
management, looking at each organization separately is
not enough, but having a holistic approach [1] is
important [2, 3]. Resilience, which refers to the
capabilities of absorbing disturbances [4], is a purpose
that disaster relief organizations should achieve in
disaster management.
This paper provides a holistic lens to understand
how an organization achieves resilience in a disaster
situation through collaboration with external
organizations. We pay attention to collaboration
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because collaboration among various players in the
field is important during catastrophic events, as it
reduces the complexity of the events [5, 6]. To
understand its complexity, the social ecology theory
[7] and the actor-network theory [8] are applied.
However, these theories look into social aspects or
network formation process and provide little
understanding on the process of adaptation [9].
We apply the notion of an ecosystem [10, 11] to
guide us to a holistic understanding of disaster
management. Resilience theory envisions ecosystems
as constantly changing and reorganizing processes [12].
In this sense, during a disaster, we should consider
organizations not as stable states [13], but as entities
that coevolve to adapt to a particular situation through
change and reorganization processes.
This paper presents two different cases from Japan
and Nepal to explore an effective ecosystem in disaster
management. For this purpose, we use an information
ecology framework. We derived the framework from
the literature [14], in which the authors define
information ecology as “a system of people, practices,
values, and technologies in a particular local
environment” (Page 49). The concept of information
ecology particularly focuses on human activities that
are served by technology while the social ecology
framework does not have information in its center.
Based on an information ecology perspective, the
case analysis shows how key actors collaborate within
an ecosystem during a disaster situation, particularly
reveals how the actors organize through information
sharing among related organizations. In the Japan case,
the main focus is on the role of the local government,
as it is the agency closest to the residents and has
knowledge of the residents and resources in the area
[15]. The Nepal case, on the other hand, focuses on the
role of digital and local communities in addressing the
disaster-related challenges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
(1) a description of information ecology, (2) data
collection and analysis, (3) a case description and
analysis, (4) discussion, and (5) conclusion.
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2. Information ecology framework
Information ecology is considered a complex
system
of
parts
and
relationships.
It
exhibits diversity and experiences continual evolution.
Different parts of ecology coevolve, changing together
according to the relationships in the system.
Several keystone species are necessary for the survival
of the ecology. In addition, information ecologies have
a sense of locality. The key elements of information
ecology summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Key elements of information ecology
[derived from ref. [14]]
Key
Elements
System

Diversity

Coevolution

Keystone
species

Locality

Description
Strong interrelationships and
dependencies developing among
different parts and taking different
forms.
Different kinds of people, ideas,
technologies and tools that work
together in a complementary way.
Capability of adapting to new
constraints and possibilities, which, in
turn, lead to further change.
Information ecologies evolve as new
ideas, tools and activities, and new
forms of expertise rise up within
them.
The presence of keystone species is
crucial to the survival of the ecology
itself, e.g., skilled people whose
presence is necessary to support the
effective use of technology.
Local settings or attributes that give
people the meaning of the ecology.

1) System
Like a biological ecology, information ecology is
marked by strong interrelationships and dependencies
among its different parts. The parts of information
ecology may differ from each other.
2) Diversity
In information ecology, there are different kinds of
people and tools. In a well-functioning information
ecology, they work together in a complementary way.
3) Coevolution
A well-functioning ecology is not static, even when
it is in equilibrium. Similar dynamics are at work in
evolving information ecologies. The pace of new
technology development ensures that school, work, and
home settings will continue to be offered newer, faster,

and different tools and services—not just once, but
repeatedly. Information ecologies evolve as new ideas,
tools, activities, and forms of expertise arise in them.
This means that people must be prepared to participate
in the ongoing development of their information
ecologies.
4) Keystone Species
Ecology is marked by the presence of certain
keystone species whose presence is crucial to the
survival of the ecology itself.
5) Locality
The habitation of a local context is its location
within a network of relationships. To whom does it
belong? To what and to whom is it connected?
Through what relations? The habitation of a local
context is its set of family ties in the local information
ecology.
By applying the information ecology framework,
we explore how the ecosystem in the cases of Japan
and Nepal worked. Though the literature reflects
different views of resilience, this paper takes the path
of providing capabilities of absorbing disturbances and
allows for ongoing, proactive development; i.e., a
dynamic, adaptive interplay between sustaining and
evolving processes in response to change [16-20]. In
this sense, we see how each key element of
information ecology framework interacts with the
others, informing us of how such a capability is given
to relief organizations.
Before moving to the case analyses, we present the
approach to data collection in the next section.

3. Data collection and analysis
The largest earthquake on record occurred on the
east coast of Japan on March 11, 2011. The earthquake,
called the Great East Japan Earthquake, was recorded
at a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale and caused
massive damage to a very wide area of the country.
This earthquake is unique in that it caused a rupture
zone 500 km long and produced a tsunami of 40
meters. The Fire and Disaster Management Agency
reported 19,418 deaths, 6,220 injuries, and 2,592
missing as of March 2016. It also reported 121,800
houses entirely lost and more than 1,000,000 partially
destroyed. The east coast of Japan has been known as
being prone to earthquakes, so local authorities
practiced exercises and residents were well prepared;
however, the scale of the earthquake was beyond any
prior assumptions and caused devastating damage,
especially to the northeast coastal area of Japan.
Five months after the earthquake, in August of
2011, one of the authors conducted a field survey in an
inland city called Tono to investigate the damage and
situation. Although five months had passed since the
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earthquake, residents of the most damaged places
around the coast area were still in a state of panic, so
conducting a field survey was impossible. Tono was
affected by the earthquake; however, the damage level
was less pronounced than in the coastal area. A twohour face-to-face interview has been conducted with
the mayor and two officials in the disaster management
headquarters. The interview was open-ended but main
focus was how they supported neighboring towns
where were heavily damaged. The interview was
recorded and transcribed. Following the administration
of the survey, a presentation given by the same
officials at Tono in July 2012, one year after the
interview, about their activities of a base for supply
and rescue operations to the damaged area was used as
supplementary data.
On April 25th, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake
hit Nepal, which caused widespread damage across 14
districts out of 75 in the whole country. On the same
day, a powerful aftershock of 6.9 magnitude hit again.
More than 8,000 people died, and more than 21,000
people were injured. Four out of the seven UNESCO
World Heritage sites in Nepal were severely damaged
in the earthquake. Amidst this chaos and panic,
Kathmandu Living Lab (KLL) started communicating,
enrolling, and mobilizing community people and
digital humanitarians all around the world to respond
to the earthquake.
One of the authors visited Nepal to conduct a field
study in December of 2015. The detailed narratives
from the director of the KLL, who had been directly
involved in the whole crisis response process, as well
as a log book of KLL’s skype conversation with
different actors were analyzed. In addition to this
conversation analysis, we also conducted interviews
with locals from Kathmandu (the capital city of Nepal),
volunteers from OpenStreetMap (OSM), which is a
collaborative project to create a free editable map of
the world [21], and the standby task force that was
directly involved in the Nepal earthquake event. We
also talked to the community members from Timal
village near Kathmandu and conducted an in-depth
interview with a senior researcher (from a private
social science research institute) who is currently doing
case studies in Sindhupalchowk (one of the most
affected areas). Additionally, we also had an informal
discussion with KLL staff members. In total around 20
interviews were conducted. The interview lasts from
30 minutes to 60 minutes. All the interviews were
audio recorded and transcribed. We also took detail
notes of the interviews and discussions.
Most of the interviews were open-ended and
conducted on site. In the interview, we try to acquire a
broader understanding of the phenomena, such as who
was involved, how different actors responded, how the

event change their socioeconomic behavior, what kinds
of digital technologies were used and so on. Some
additional interviews with the locals of Kathmandu and
nearby villages provided a broader contextual picture
of the crisis situation in Nepal. The primary data, such
as interviews, were supplemented by adding secondary
data, such as news articles, government documents on
earthquake response, and research articles on KLL.
In analyzing the data, we went through the
interview transcripts and extracted the main constructs
and mapped those constructs to the five elements of the
information ecology framework. The analysis revealed
the intricacies of crisis management ecosystem.
Throughout the analysis, constant data comparison was
conducted to enable holistic understanding of the five
elements of information ecology.

4. Case description and analysis
In this section, two case studies from the Great East
Japan Earthquake in Japan and the 7.8 magnitude
earthquake in Nepal are presented. These two cases
differ in nature. The Japan case is initiated by the local
government in Tono, whereas the Nepal case is
initiated by local communities (KLL). So the analysis
will highlight how the ecosystem in each case formed
and evolved.

4.1. The case of Tono City in Japan
One man ran into the disaster response
headquarters in Tono on midnight of March 11, 2011.
Eleven hours before that, at 14:42 on the same day, the
Great East Japan Earthquake hit the east coast of Japan.
The man came from a neighboring town called Otsuchi
where more than half of the town land had been
flooded and washed away by the tsunami. Since roads
were destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami, the man
climbed up a mountain on his foot and found the
headquarters in Tono. He said,
“500 people evacuated to the Otsuchi high school.
Water and foods are running out. Please give us a
help.”
From this moment, Tono became an important base
for supply and rescue operations to the heavily
damaged coast area. Three hours after the man’s arrival,
officials of a fire brigade started heading to Otsuchi
bringing food, water, fuel, and blankets.
Tono is an inland city located in Iwate prefecture
(regional government) where its coast areas were one
of the most damaged by the earthquake. The mayor
had been thinking that Tono should be a base for
supporting the coastal areas at the time of a disaster.
Since Tono is 50km away from the coastline, the
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mayor views the geographical condition as an
advantage.
In 2007, four years before the earthquake, a
regional disaster preparedness exercise of providing
medical supports and delivering relief was conducted
in Tono. The number of participants was 87
organizations from the Iwate region. This exercise
resulted in formulating a neighboring municipalities
networking association with the purpose of
collaborating and supporting each other at the time of a
disaster. Nine towns, including Tono, joined this
association. At this moment, Tono foresaw that the
following functions would be necessary to fulfill its
mission as an effective base for relief supply and
rescue operations in the time of a disaster:
1) Open the municipal park as a temporary
heliport for external organizations providing
relief operations in the initial response phase
such as the Red Cross or army forces.
2) Using empty land in the town as a parking
space and a campground.
3) Transferring serious casualties from damaged
areas to inland medical facilities.
4) Providing facilities for storing and managing
relief goods (medicine, blankets, water servers,
and so on).
5) Providing
open
space
for
external
organizations to have meetings and for other
purposes.
Based on the above assumptions, a disaster exercise
with the purpose of supporting damaged areas was
conducted again in 2008. More than 18,000 people
from 25 neighboring towns, police, a fire brigade, and
army forces participated in the one-day event.
The earthquake hit this area three years later. At
15:00 on March 11 in 2011, just 20 minutes after the
earthquake, Tono opened a base for external
supporting organizations in a municipal park in spite of
the fact the earthquake inflicted much damage upon
Tono itself to its government buildings. Ten days after
the earthquake, the number of people who aggregated
in Tono for the purpose of supporting the damaged
area was more than 3,500. As of June of 2012, one
year and three months after the earthquake, Tono
received 6,400 packs of rice (10 kg for one pack),
128,000 bottles of water (two liters for each bottle),
178,000 set of clothes and blankets, and 166,000 boxes
of food from 44 municipalities all over the country.
Moreover, 13 organizations, including three
universities, set up their bases in Tono as support
offices.
In addition to providing facilities to external
organizations, Tono itself was sending officials to
neighboring damaged towns to collect situational
information and deliver requested goods. The number

of dispatches was more than 300 for the first six
months after the earthquake. Dispatched officials
delivered relief goods and returned back to Tono with
requests from the damaged area. Since information and
communication technology (ICT) was damaged,
officials were the only way to collect and deliver
information. They simply repeated information
collection and relief goods delivery. The disaster
exercises in 2007 and 2008 helped smooth actions in
the initial response phase; however, the exercise did
not assume the delivery of relief operations for such a
long time. It was beyond the scope of the exercise.
Decisions were made by the mayor based on the
constantly changing situation
with constant
improvisations. Other local governments offered their
experience and knowledge to Tono on how to deal with
the situation. It helped Tono a great deal.
The failure of ICT, especially in terms of a blackout,
is what Tono city did not predict when conducting the
exercises. Until the power supply resumed two days
after the earthquake, a radio broadcasting accessible by
a radio-charged battery was the only way to grasp the
situation. If the man from Otsuchi town had not come
into the disaster headquarters office, Tono would not
have known how devastating the situation was in
Otsuchi. Officials sent to the damaged areas were the
means to having knowledge of the situation; however,
it took some time to go back and forth so the
information was not always current. Since the situation
in the area was changing all the time, getting real-time
information was critical for mobilizing relief
operations. The mayor of Tono recalled the situation
and said the following:
“For several weeks after the earthquake, every
supportive organization was in a state of panic, and
information received from them was sometimes
incorrect. Reports from officials we sent to the
damaged area were the most reliable information
sources. However, I believe that since army forces or
police should have known the situation in the towns in
the coastal area better than us, we would have been
able to mobilize relief operations more quickly if we
had been given the situational information on heavily
damaged area.”
Since all organizations, i.e., Tono as a local
government, Iwate as a regional government and police,
a fire brigade and army forces as external organizations,
were conducting relief operations separately,
information was not shared among them. Tono was
forced to collect related information on their own. In
the heavily damaged area, sending requests outside
town was impossible because damaged municipalities
lost all communication channels, including the power
supply. Only human beings could deliver information
and ask for help.
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4.2. Analysis of the Japan case
We organize our findings around key elements of
information ecology, which are shown in Table 1. The
focus is to understand how the ecosystem worked in
Tono during the earthquake and what the challenges
were.
4.2.1
System
“System” aims at building interrelationships among
different parts of information ecology. The mayor of
Tono has been aware of the importance of organizing a
collaborative platform in case the coastal area is
destroyed by the disaster. The regional disaster
exercise was conducted in 2007 with 87 organizations
from the area. One year later, the extended exercise
took place in the same manner, with neighboring towns,
police, a fire brigade, and army forces.
Emergency management has been categorized into
four components: mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery [22-24]. The exercise mainly focused on
preparedness and response phases. The scope of
responses in this exercise was not long-term, but rather
short-tem, namely the initial response [25] phase. In
reality, during the earthquake, disaster management
operations lasted for more than one year, and this was
beyond prior assumptions.
4.2.2
Diversity
The literature points out nurturing “diversity” is
one of the critical factors in building resilience in
social ecological systems [12]. Different kinds of
organizations participated in the regional disaster
exercises. Through the exercises, they shared
procedures on how to react to a disaster in the initial
response phase; however, tools or information systems
were developed separately for each organization. In
addition, note that the exercise succeeded in creating a
collaborative platform among public organizations, but
failed to involve local residents or communities, and
voluntary associations.
4.2.3
Coevolution
“Coevolution” involves generating new ideas,
tools, or activities. The first regional exercise resulted
in formulating a networking organization of nine
neighboring towns in Tono. In this sense, the
networking association is one form of coevolution. The
learning process is a key mechanism for the evolution
in social ecological systems [26]. As the case shows,
since the earthquake was quite large and beyond prior
assumptions, disaster management operations were
prolonged for several months and years. The exercise
focused on the short-term response, and Tono did not
possess knowledge on how to deal with the prolonged
situation. Another regional government in Shizuoka
prefecture located 700 km away from Tono provided
knowhow on how to deal with the situation, as it was
not affected by the earthquake. Shizuoka prefecture has

gained knowledge through its experience since the
Shizuoka region covers the central east coast of Japan
and is prone to earthquakes. The officials in Tono
recalled the situation and said the following:
“The knowledge provided by Shizuoka enabled us
to develop our own procedure for acting as a relief
supply and rescue base operator for such a long time.”
4.2.4
Keystone species
In this case, Tono plays a critical role in
configuring an ecosystem with “keystone species.” The
basic functions that Tono provided to external relief
organizations were opening their land for multiple
purposes, such as a heliport, a transportation hub for
injured persons, medicine and other relief goods, and
meetings. In addition, lodges were offered by local
communities. At the end of March, 2011, the social
welfare councils of Tono organized networks of
individuals and voluntary associations. They prepared
to receive volunteers from all over the country and
matched needs from the damaged area and skills of
volunteers. The social welfare councils and citizen
volunteers made more than 140 thousand rice balls that
were delivered to the affected towns. Tono is important
not only in its geographical conditions, but also in its
capability to aggregate related individuals and
associations together, although these associations were
not included in the exercise.
4.2.5
Locality
Communication tools such as landline, mobile
phones, and the Internet were useless because the
power supply was cut down. The only means to collect
“local” information was city officials. However, in this
case, the local context had not been shared among
related organizations, even if the power supply would
have continued. Since the long-term disaster operations
were out of the exercise scope, the common tools for
supporting information sharing were not developed in
advance. Each organization collected information
separately. Difficulty in information sharing was the
biggest challenge for Tono in providing supply and
rescue base services. The exercise succeed in
cultivating initial response procedures as domain
knowledge [27], while it did not cover a longer
response phase, which requires local contexts to keep
track of what happened and what was needed.

4.3. The case of KLL
KLL 1 is an active and growing technology
community established in 2013 to improve urban
planning and management. The community is
comprised of software start-ups, tech incubators,
1

http://www.kathmandulivinglabs.org/
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universities, and the local OSM chapter including
mapping volunteers from all around the world. With
the motto of “together we can do more,” KLL
harnesses local knowledge, develops open data, and
promotes civic technologies.
On April 25th, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit
Nepal, which caused widespread damage across 14
districts. Amidst this chaos and panic, KLL people
started brainstorming how to respond to the
earthquake. The next day, KLL established a room for
the headquarters for its earthquake response in a
parking area because the office was damaged. The
headquarters office explained KLL’s actions in the
relief effort and how others could help. The director of
KLL was aware that this work could not be done alone
and locally; therefore, he contacted the Digital
Humanitarian team that evening. The Digital
Humanitarian team is a volunteer network, including
the standby task force [21], to seek help from the
international OSM community. This network is unique
in using digital tools to respond to a crisis situation.
KLL received an unprecedented response from
volunteer mappers. Within 48 hours after the
earthquake, over 1,500 people begin to remotely map
the affected area in OSM using aerial imagery. To
speed up their response program, they deployed
QuakeMap volunteers. The purpose was to bridge the
information gap between the quake victims and relief
agencies.
KLL coordinated with and engaged mappers
throughout the world using online chat platforms, such
as Skype. Meanwhile, the demand for maps and data
was growing. Individuals, volunteer groups, and
humanitarian organizations began to request data and
printable maps for relief operations from KLL. Around
2,200 volunteers have contributed through remote
mapping. In the course of extending their services,
KLL established contact with the GIS division of the
Nepal army. KLL received requests to map camps of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are displaced
due to the earthquake. To handle this problem, KLL
asked volunteer mappers to assist in locating IDP
camps with aerial imagery. KLL also provided a
training session to doctors who were involved in the
relief operations. KLL members trained the doctors in
how to use OSM and QuakeMap to determine where
their help was needed. At this point, 3,300 mappers
have assisted in mapping in OSM. To meet the need
for digital data and printable maps of the affected
districts, KLL introduced QuakeRelief, a repository of
printable maps that used the data mapping that
volunteers have added to OSM Nepal.
Within a month of operation, The New York Times
reported on KLL's earthquake response efforts. The
news further helped in spreading the word about what

KLL was doing. This was the first time KLL’s work
appeared in major international news media after the
earthquake. The international news pulled the attention
of the Nepal government, which consequently
recognized KLL’s work.
On May 1st, 2015, the National Information
Technology Center (NITC), which facilitates ICTenabled delivery of all government services in Nepal,
listed QuakeMap on its website as an important part of
the local earthquake response initiative. KLL also
began working with UNESCO and the Department of
Archeology to document the condition of cultural
heritage sites in the Kathmandu Valley. KLL
developed a mobile data collection app and held a
training course to show volunteers how to report the
conditions of sites in the mobile app.
On May 12, 2015, an aftershock of 7.3 magnitude
further damaged the affected districts, serving as a
strong reminder of the importance of both recovering
from disasters and preparing for future natural
disasters. The aftershock made KLL’s office too
dangerous to enter; therefore, the office moved to
another temporary location in a building at
Kasthamandap School. At this point, QuakeMap
continued to be a vital tool in the earthquake response
with 1,500 reports about the needs from victims and
relief efforts. Volunteers analyzed and classified the
reports and followed up the reports until they were
resolved. In the aftermath, on May 18, a landslide
blocked a river called Kali Gandaki, highlighting a
need for continued mapping. The blockage created a
temporary dam, which led to massive flooding
upstream of the dam.
On May 24, KLL moved to a new. On July 7, the
Department of Education, Central Bureau of Statistics
(CBS), and The World Bank collaborated with KLL to
support an assessment of damage to schools in affected
zones. KLL’s expertise in mobile data collection
technology made the collaboration possible. Similarly,
KLL and international academic institutions jointly
held a workshop to discuss the role of data and
technology in the relief efforts following the
earthquake in April. Along with Kathmandu University
and UAViators (unmanned aerial vehicle), KLL coorganized a workshop on using Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, for humanitarian work.
The high-quality aerial imagery that UAVs collect can
be used for assessing damage and planning
reconstruction. After its successful completion of the
response program, KLL closed QuakeMap.org. They
currently moved their focus to the recovery phase.
KLL is involved in the work of school infrastructure
damage assessment. The updated OSM data—created
by the work of 9,000 volunteers from around the
world-—continues to serve as an important resource.
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KLL is working continually in enrolling new actors
and mobilizing the actors into other crisis management
activities, such as housing damage assessment. The
assessment uses mobile data collection to assess
housing damage through all earthquake-affected
districts.

4.4. Analysis of the KLL case
Based on the five key elements of information
ecology, we have identified various entities of KLL
Nepal, their interaction with various players, and their
coevolution. These are elaborated upon below as
follows.
4.4.1

System

In the KLL case, a structured system, such as the
regional exercise flame, does not exist; however, as
introduced in the previous section, KLL consists of
several organizations. KLL is not just one organization
or individual, but rather a network hub of digital
humanitarians (standby taskforce), OSM mappers,
local communities, doctors, national and international
(remote) volunteers, the Nepal army, and government
organizations. KLL was founded by a social
entrepreneur with the purpose of implementing mobile
and internet-based technology solutions for open
government and civic innovation to enhance urban
resilience and civic engagement. KLL has since grown
into an active technology community established to
improve urban planning and management. They now
deal with identifying the usage of technologies in
solving complex problems, such as response and
recovery in emergency circumstances. As we can see,
interdependencies among various players have been
embedded in the system of KLL from its origin.
4.4.2

Diversity

In the KLL case, each player had a clear role. The
role of the digital humanitarian team was to map and
cluster the data, the Nepal army was focusing on
sending the personnel to affected areas, aid agencies
wanted to send their resources, and doctors were
volunteering to provide medical facilities. The local
communities were also working collectively to find out
about the victims, and the role of KLL was to
coordinate between all these actors and analyze the
huge amount of data. In contrast to the Japan case, the
KLL network did not include governmental
organization in their first attempts.
4.4.3

Coevolution

Information ecology is not static. It is constantly
evolving [14]. Similar dynamics can be seen in the
case of KLL. Digital tools, such as chat rooms,

mapping tools, email systems, UAVs, GPS systems,
and social media, served as mediators in carrying out
the rescue operations. In fact, without these
technologies, it was quite difficult to get the real-time
location of the victims and to conduct the measurement
of the hazards.
These development efforts resulted in collaborative
works with KLL and the international/governmental
organization such as the Department of Education in
Nepal, CBS, and the World Bank to create new
services (damage assessment works) in the affected
areas.
4.4.4

Keystone species

In the KLL case, KLL, digital humanitarians such
as the standby taskforce, OSM, Nepal Army, and aid
agencies, including government organizations, were
essential. However, KLL in this context as a keystone
species coordinates organizational collaboration as
well as thousands of international mappers.
4.4.5

Locality

Locality is a particularly important attribute of
information ecologies. Only people who are immersed
in a particular information ecology can provide a local
habitation and a name for new technologies [14]. For
instance, in this case the main actor was KLL, which
has a greater understanding of the local context and
their socio-geographical configuration, and thus, the
local communities and local governments, which have
a better understanding of local needs, and legitimacy
compare to outside interventionist. KLL developed
OSM, QuakeMap, and other digital tools, which helped
KLL to gather the local context into the map.

5. Discussion
The notion of resilience enhances the capacity of
social ecological systems to adapt to uncertainty and
surprise [28]. The purpose of this paper is to explore
the way to achieve resilience from an ecosystem
perspective. Two cases from Japan and Nepal are
analyzed based on the information ecology framework.
The findings are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Key elements of information ecology in
Japan and Nepal
Tono (Japan)
KLL (Nepal)
The regional
KLL (software
System
disaster exercises
start-ups, tech
incubators,
universities, local
OSM chapter)
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Diversity

Coevolution

Keystone
species
Locality

Tono city,
neighboring
towns, police, a
fire brigade, army
forces, local
communities,
volunteers
A networking
association of
neighboring
towns, knowledge
share from
Shizuoka
prefecture
Tono city, the
social welfare
councils
Tono city
officials

Digital
humanitarian
team, Nepal army,
doctors, local
communities

OSM, QuakeMap,
chat rooms
Collaboration
with the
Department of
Education, CBS,
and the World
Bank
KLL

KLL, local
communities,
local governments

The Japan case has effectively been operationalized
by the government organizations, whereas participation
from local communities as well as digital communities
was not strongly embedded in the ecosystem. This
results in lack of information sharing and prevents
effective disaster management.
In the Nepal case, the use of digital tools and the
involvement of digital communities, such as digital
humanitarians and mapping communities, were visible
while the collaboration for information sharing
between government organizations was lacking. For
example, in the beginning, the government
organizations and aid agencies were skeptical about
using KLL’s mapping information. They attempted to
use their own authentic channel. This might have
hindered the KLL’s crisis response team; however, the
recognition
of
real-time
mapping
through
crowdsourcing by various national and international
media and digital humanitarian communities helped
KLL to convince government and aid agencies.
Consequently, these agencies also enrolled in the KLL
crisis response team. Although there has been
collaboration regarding the use of digital mapping, less
efforts have been made by the government to apply the
channels in practice. Hence, the distribution of relief
goods was not effective.
Based on the findings, we introduce three
propositions for an effectively functioning ecosystem
in disaster management.
Proposition 1: A government initiative is essential to
formulate a structured system with diverse players.

The regional disaster exercises in Tono provided a
geographical foundation of collaboration during the
Great East Japan Earthquake. Tono was a hub to pass
relief goods offered by 44 municipalities around Japan
to the damaged area. However, the exercise was only
open to government organizations, such as army forces,
a fire brigade, police, and so on. After the earthquake,
local communities, such as voluntary associations,
were organized with the initiative taken by the Tono
social welfare councils. Local communities including
volunteers were organized flexibility in a selforganized [29, 30] manner under the initiative of Tono.
Looking at the case of KLL, they formed structured
relationships among different players in the local
community, except the government organizations. As a
result, KLL succeeded in collecting situational
information on OSM and other digital tools. However,
they did not have the capability to mobilize relief
goods distribution, while government organizations
have this. It took some time until KLL was
acknowledged by them as a reliable aid agency to
cooperate. When governmental organizations join the
platform, they require social trust to judge the
reliability of the platform. KLL acknowledged social
trust, mainly as reported by national/international
media.
In summary, the literature pointed out the
importance of diversity of a social ecological system
[12], however, the information ecology framework
does not suggest how diverse actors collaborate to
formulate a structured system. In our analysis, we find
the importance of the government initiative especially
in a crisis management situation that managing relief
goods operations become critical. Forms of such a
structured system vary, i.e., exercises, a collaborating
network, and so on. Efforts to involve local
communities should be made in the preparedness phase
to mobilize an effective ecosystem in the time of the
event.
Proposition 2: Gathering local knowledge is essential
for promoting the coevolution of the ecosystem.
In the information ecology framework, the
importance of five elements was not characterized.
Through our case analysis, we find that coevolution is
the most important element for a functioning
ecosystem in disaster management, as disaster
management is unique in responding to constantly
changing situations. Damages and demands differ
place by place, which makes disaster management
complicated and unpredictable. An ecosystem should
learn and evolve through the entire response phase.
Coevolution embeds leaning features in its process
[26]. Shizuoka provided knowledge to Tono on how to
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react to the prolonged disaster situation, which helped
Tono to adapt to an unexpected situation. A
networking organization of nine neighboring
municipalities generated an opportunity to obtain relief
goods from 44 municipalities. Local knowledge
enabled Tono to learn and applied a new form of relief
supply and rescue operations.
More than several thousand volunteers helped to
collect local knowledge in Nepal. KLL’s actions were
visible through chat rooms, allowing volunteers to
understand what they were doing and going to do.
QuakeMap, developed by KLL through crowdsourcing,
especially involving digital humanitarian and local
communities, solved the information gap Tono was
facing, that is, the gap between the needs of affected
areas and relief organizations. Tono succeeded in
formalizing a public organization’s network as well as
involving local communities subsequently; however,
they failed to acquire the proper information from the
field. As a result, the ecosystem stopped coevolving.
On the other hand, KLL’s various attempts to gather
local knowledge and connect those to actual relief
activities enhanced further collaboration with the
Department of Education, CBS, and the World Bank.
All the actors started to believe in KLL mapping and
make it standard locating tools rather than paper-based
traditional maps; then, they started moving toward
using digital tools for mapping crisis situations.
In summary, coevolution is necessary to respond to
constantly changing disaster situations. Coevolution in
both cases can be observed as the result of sharing
local knowledge. In this sense, locality can generate
domain knowledge. The degree to which local
knowledge is gathered affects ecosystem performance
and further disaster management operations.
Proposition 3: Execution of digital tools by keystone
species can enhance local knowledge sharing and
enable effective relief operations.
As a result of understanding importance of local
knowledge share, a question that arises is: How should
local knowledge be shared? Since no digital tools were
embedded in the ecosystem in Tono, city officials were
the only means to collect local information. Tono’s
initiative enabled diverse players to gather, but tools
for information collection were developed separately.
This forced Tono to take much more time to obtain
real-time information than usual, while QuakeMap
received more than 1,500 reports from victims and
relief efforts within 48 hours after the earthquake. The
KLL case is unique in that the development of digital
tools emerged corresponding to the situation. They did
not prepare any tools in advance; however, starting
with OSM, QuakeMap bridged disaster victims’

demand and relief agencies. Around 9,000 volunteers
from all over the world contributed to creating OSM
remotely. Following these tools, QuakeRelief as a
repository of printable maps and several mobile data
collection apps for reporting field conditions were
chronologically developed. The literature points out the
importance of improvisation in response [31] and
intuitive procedures for disasters [5, 6]. This is a future
topic that can be studied to explore why KLL succeed
in improvising their response by developing several
new communication tools during the earthquake.
In summary, it is apparent that execution of these
digital tools by keystone species can enhanced local
knowledge gathering; however, at the same time we
recognize that integration of the tools are necessary
and it is impossible to prepare all the appropriate tools
before an event. Tools should be developed
corresponding to a situation that is changing all the
time. What local governments can do is maintain their
connection to communities that are capable of
developing such digital tools.

6. Conclusion
This paper reports two cases from Japan and Nepal
to establish a holistic approach to disaster management.
A theoretical lens of an ecosystem and the information
ecology framework are applied to the case analyses.
Three propositions that guide us in further
understanding how an ecosystem works are presented.
From an ecological perspective, the mutual
dependency between diverse players and the
coevolution process should function in a proper way.
By looking at the interrelationships of each element in
information ecology, we can gain insight into how an
ecosystem works [32].
The propositions show the importance of
governmental initiatives to involve several players and
maintain an ecosystem’s diversity. Even if engagement
is accomplished in a self-organized way, the
government plays an important role in delivering relief
operations (especially the distribution of relief goods).
Coevolution is the key element in a functioning
ecosystem, but we should take into account the local
context [33]. In this sense, gathering local knowledge
is essential for promoting coevolution. Digital tools
support local knowledge sharing, but they are
developed in the field.
While the results are only from two cases, at the
same time, we believe these findings can contribute to
the research by providing the means for how an
organization achieves resilience. In addition, the
propositions suggest how to make disaster
management systems sustainable and effective. We
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believe these findings can be applied in solving real
problems in practice.
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